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Democratisation and consolidation of a political system encompass a range of complex 
challenges, for which effective leadership is pivotal. However, the skills a leader requires to 
break through and introduce change are not necessarily the same as those needed to 
maintain stability. This article examines the case of Viktor Yushchenko as president of 
Ukraine following the Orange Revolution. The negotiated transfer of power from the 
previous semi-authoritarian regime rendered consolidation difficult, by limiting 
opportunities for a complete break. Within the residual ‘grey area’, a number of actors 
continued to participate and create tension. The regime that emerged was characterised by 
political infighting and instability, leading to the defeat of candidates associated with the 
Orange Revolution in the 2010 presidential elections. This article argues that the inability to 
move towards a consolidated democratic political system was due to the failure of the 
transitional leader, rather than the political and institutional configuration. 
 
Keywords: democratisation, leadership, non-democratic legacies, 
presidentialism, Ukraine 
 
Clear and effective leadership is crucial in shaping and directing the democratisation 
process. Leaders in this position are required to dismantle the existing non-
democratic system while at the same time introducing new practices and institutions 
to reinforce democratisation (Breslauer 2002). The ability of a leader to challenge 
and replace a non-democratic regime is not necessarily associated with an ability to 
introduce reform and consolidate the democratic system. Examining the uncertainty 
of democratisation Breslauer (2002, p. 270) noted: 
 
A breakthrough may be required to undo the old structures and delegitimize 
the old culture. But numerous and repeated follow-up initiatives are 
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required to put new structures in place and to build legitimacy for the new 
order. 
 
This point echoed Rustow (1970) who argued that, when considering 
democratisation, it is necessary to distinguish the factors that sustain a democracy 
from those that lead to its emergence. The appeal of transitional leaders stems from 
their role as change makers, with questionable durability in the altered context. The 
continued presence of a transitional leader may undermine and weaken the ability 
of the emerging regime to consolidate, by restricting opportunities for normal 
politics to emerge. 
 
When considering the effects of transitional leadership it is important to take into 
account the institutional structures operating in each case. Presidential systems have 
been identified as prone to democratic breakdown and reversion to authoritarian 
rule, as a result of inherent weaknesses. It is therefore necessary to examine these 
claims, to determine the importance of institutional choice during the 
democratisation (Elgie 2005). Concerns over the apparent weakness of 
presidentialism have led to analysis of cases in a wide variety of regions (Ishiyama 
and Kennedy 2001, Fukuyama et al 2005, Breuer 2007, Abdukadirov 2009). In 
addition to the institutional configuration, the broader social and cultural contexts 
play an important role in determining the decisions that leaders are able to make 
(Wiarda 2001).  
 
This paper examines the leadership of Viktor Yushchenko as president of the Ukraine 
from 2005 to 2010. Attempts by the preceding non-democratic regime to maintain 
power by manipulating the 2004 presidential elections saw widespread public 
protests, leading to an elite compromise with Yushchenko assuming the presidency. 
Yushchenko came to power with plans to reform the political system but struggled 
to control tensions within the executive branch and limit conflict with the legislative 
branch, leading to constitutional deadlock and fragmentation of reformist forces 
(Flikke 2008). As the site of one of the colour revolutions, Ukraine provides an 
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interesting case for consideration of the challenges in moving towards democracy 
after a period of stagnation or reversal of the democratisation process. Following the 
breakup of the Soviet Union and an initial opening, Ukraine was unable to move 
towards full democratisation and saw the emergence of the Kuchma regime, which 
attempted to maintain a semi-democratic political system. The Orange Revolution 
and Yushchenko’s election presented an opportunity to ‘reset the clock’ and move 
towards a democratic political system. The inability of the leader to democratise the 
system raises important issues about cases of incomplete democratisation, 
particularly what factors may prevent democratic consolidation.  
 
This article examines Viktor Yushchenko’s inability to capitalise on the support 
received during the Orange Revolution and move Ukraine forcefully towards 
democracy.  The aims of the article are: (1) to examine the individual factors that 
shape the ability of a transitional leader to adapt to changed political contexts, and 
(2) to assess the importance of presidential institutional arrangements in 
exacerbating leadership tensions. This analysis will inform an understanding of the 
important characteristics and limitations of the transitional leader, and seek 
clarification of the reasons for Yushchenko’s apparent failure. In addition to the 
individual actions of the president, the article considers the socio-political 
constraints that Yushchenko faced as leader, particularly those arising as legacies 
from the previous non-democratic regime.  
 
The article is divided into three sections. The first examines the literature on political 
leadership in democratising states and the arguments around the apparent 
weakness of presidential systems. The second section outlines the character of the 
political system in Ukraine leading up to the Orange Revolution and the challenges 
that Yushchenko faced as president. Finally, the paper reconsiders the importance of 
the transitional leader in enabling or constraining democratisation, by assessing the 
actions of Yushchenko as president and the constraints he faced as a transitional 
leader. This section identifies factors potentially applicable to presidential leadership 
in other democratising states. 
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Transitional leadership and presidentialism  
Leadership plays a crucial role in shaping and directing the democratisation process 
and requires consideration in political analysis. Peele (2005) argues that it is 
important for political scientists to engage with leadership studies, stating that the 
decline of political parties and other institutions has seen increased demand for 
strong leadership. This issue is of particular importance in presidential regimes, due 
to the presence of a strong individual leader at the centre of the political system. The 
choice of a presidential system during democratisation has been attributed to the 
desire to introduce a ‘strong hand’ to guide the country through the uncertainties of 
the transitional period (Stepan and Skach 1994). However, presidential systems can 
introduce conflict as the zero-sum nature of the political system means that 
unsuccessful candidates are excluded, encouraging rivalry and conflict rather than 
cooperation (Linz 1990, Colomer 1995). These risks are heightened during the 
democratisation period, as the fluidity and complexity of relations can increase the 
discretionary power of the president as the ‘rules of the game’ are settled (Shugart 
and Haggard 1997). Together, these features increase the chances that the 
presidential form of transitional leadership will lead to instability and breakdown. 
 
The elite driven nature of democratisation and the associated uncertainty means 
that leaders are crucial in shaping the process. It is therefore important to focus on 
the performance of political leaders during this time, identifying reasons for success 
or failure in moving the regime towards consolidated democracy. As noted above, 
the transitional leader must engage in a form of creative destruction, replacing and 
reforming existing institutions and practices (Breslauer 2002). This requires a strong 
direction and determination, as the transitional leader faces both external 
challenges in managing rivals and institutional inertia, while also resisting internal 
desires to exercise control over the political system and remove opposition. 
Examining the importance of leadership in governance Memon and Weber (2010 p. 
109) argue that:  
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key tasks include assisting participants in discovering common ground and 
the benefits of collaboration by identifying prospective tradeoffs, facilitating 
information exchanges, and conducting the decision process in a neutral, 
honest, and fair manner. Implicit here is that CCBs [collaborative capacity 
builders] are instrumental in convincing participants that their stakes will be 
protected during negotiations and decision-making, and that participants’ 
own interests are likely to be best served by agreeing to bargain in good 
faith.  
 
The success of a transitional leader therefore depends on the ability to manoeuvre 
between competing forces and drive through change while compromising where 
necessary to maintain stability and cohesion. A further issue is the ability of the 
transitional leader to adapt, moving from the role of key actor shaping and 
reforming the system to working as part of that same system. This leads to the 
question of whether transitional leaders have a limited lifespan, driven by their 
inability to function in times of normal politics (see the cases of Aldolfo Suárez in 
Spain and Boris Yeltsin in Russia (O’Brien 2007)). In this context it is necessary to 
consider forms of leadership and the constraints that leaders face. 
 
In an influential work, Burns (1978) identified two core styles of leadership based on 
the underlying motivation, value, and purpose of the leader. Transactional 
leadership ‘occurs when one person takes the initiative in making contact with 
others for the purpose of exchange of valued things’, while transformative 
leadership ‘occurs when one or more persons engage with others in such a way that 
leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality.’ 
(Burns 1978, pp. 19-20) It has subsequently been argued that leaders can also exhibit 
a combination of the two core leadership styles or neither (Saskin and Rosenbach 
1993), with change driven by variations in the external environment as much as the 
actions of the individual leader. Examining the distinctions between leadership styles 
points to the important role played by different actors in shaping and directing the 
democratising political system.  A transformative leader is able to look beyond 
his/her own desires and support the broader goals of regime development and move 
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towards a consolidated democratic system, while a transactional leader may attempt 
to pursue short-term gains to the detriment of broader political development. 
Transformative leadership relies on the personal charisma and standing of the 
leader; where this declines he/she may adopt a more transactional style (O’Brien 
2007). The leadership style adopted serves the goals of the leader, which can be 
noble, liberating and enriching, or instead used to manipulate, mislead, and repress 
(Cronin 1993, p. 7). Addressing specific types of leadership, Elgie (1995 p. 4) argues 
that these can include charismatic, revolutionary, innovative, personal, individual, 
collective, reactive, and managerial. Each of these leadership types builds on the two 
styles of leadership, to serve the goals of the particular leader. Styles of leadership 
are therefore important in shaping the operation of the regime. 
 
When assessing the ability of the leader to shape the political system it is necessary 
to consider personal attributes, the environment, and the character of the regime 
(Blondel 1987, p. 28). Together these features combine to determine the extent to 
which a leader is able to influence the direction of events. The personal attributes of 
the leader refer to the ability to inspire followers. Where a leader possesses 
substantial charisma, misdeeds and mistakes may be ignored or trivialised by 
followers, reducing barriers to the exercise of power (Kellerman 1984, p. 83). 
Pasquino (1990) notes that during democratisation leaders must transfer their 
authority to organisational structures and compete under the new rules to remain 
effective. This is a key point, as Cronin (1993, p. 13) notes that ‘[p]ower is the 
strength or raw force to exercise power that is accepted as legitimate…’  
 
The environmental context is important as it determines the broader social and 
political sphere in which the leader is required to operate. It shapes the ability of the 
leader to act by providing support for, and legitimising the decisions of, the leader. 
Environmental factors also establish boundaries based on custom and previous 
practice (Blondel 1987, pp. 7-8). In democratising states important environmental 
constraints exist in the form of legacies from the preceding non-democratic period. 
These legacies have been identified as the ‘values, institutions and behaviours 
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introduced by the authoritarian regime’ (Hite and Morlino, 2004, p. 28). While it is 
possible to replace non-democratic institutions, it takes much longer to alter values 
and behaviours both within the regime and society more generally. Persistence of 
non-democratic attitudes will therefore play an important role in determining what 
actions are possible and supported, regardless of the institutional structures 
introduced, and need to be carefully considered. 
 
Institutional arrangements are also important in determining the ability of the leader 
to manoeuvre and introduce a democratic political system. Elgie (1995, p. 203) notes 
that ‘institutions play…a fundamental part in structuring the nature of political 
competition’ by establishing the relative strength of participants. However, Blondel 
(1987, p. 8) argues, ‘legal and constitutional arrangements are often…unable to 
ensure that the scope of the intervention of leaders is effectively determined.’ While 
the leader is forced to operate within an institutional framework, the strength that 
he/she possesses (derived from personal attributes or the environment) may make it 
possible to transcend these limitations to a certain extent. Although, as Robinson 
(2000) argues with reference to the case of Boris Yeltsin in Russia, reliance on 
informal structures can undermine the ability to utilise the institutional structures 
when necessary. By the same token, where a leader is weakened and faces 
challenges to his/her legitimacy it may be more difficult to utilise the formal powers. 
It is therefore important to understand the character of the formal institutional 
structure within which the leader operates, and the limitations on the action that 
these may impose.  
 
There is a substantial literature on the efficacy of presidential versus parliamentary 
systems with the claim arising that presidential systems are more prone to 
breakdown and reversion to authoritarian rule than parliamentary systems (see Linz 
1990, Mainwaring 1993, Linz 1994, Stepan and Skach 1994). The central critique of 
the presidential system focuses on the institutional structure, particularly the dual 
democratic legitimacy of the executive and the legislative branches (Linz 1990). If the 
constitution does not provide for a means to resolve a deadlock, there is the 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Contemporary 
Politics and Society on 8 November 2010, available online 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2010.523936 
 8 
possibility of escalation to the point at which unconstitutional means may be used. 
Where society is divided along ethnic, cultural, or geographic lines the potential for 
conflict between the branches is increased. This can be particularly important in 
those countries where the divisions have been suppressed for a period of time under 
authoritarian control. Separation of powers is an important means of limiting 
potential conflict between the executive and legislative branches, clearly defining 
spheres of operation. However, different goals can create conflict within the state 
administration between governability and incentives for re-election (Colomer 1995). 
The potential for conflict under separation of powers can therefore increase where 
the branches represent different societal segments. There may also be an incentive 
for the president to discourage the development of a strong party system, as a 
fragmented system limits opportunities for concerted and stable opposition to 
emerge (Colomer 1995). This in turn may lead to an ineffective and powerless 
legislative branch, further enhancing the temptation of the president to seize 
control.  
 
The presidential debate has been criticised for focussing too narrowly on the office 
of the president, failing to engage with the context in which the president operates 
(Elgie 2005). In response to the claims against presidential systems, it has been 
argued that the weight of existing cultural and historical factors needs to be 
considered when attempting to assess relative success (Mainwaring and Shugart 
1997). This point has recently been reinforced by Hiroi and Omori (2009) who argue 
that although presidential regimes are more prone to breakdown, prior democratic 
experience can make them more stable than their parliamentary counterparts. 
Presidential regimes are not static, they change and grow over time as a result of 
interactions among participants at all levels, making it important to consider social, 
historical, economic, and cultural influences shape interactions. This has been 
illustrated by the transition from communism to democracy in East Central Europe 
and the former Soviet Union, as the countries in this region were required to reform 
their economic systems as well as developing new political systems, creating a whole 
new set of challenges (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). The legacy of the previous 
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regime casts a shadow over political development during democratisation and may 
hinder attempts at reform. 
 
Presidential power is derived from two sources: constitutional structures and 
partisan support. The latter refers to the power attributable to ‘legislative majority 
or other features of the party system’ (Shugart and Haggard 1997, p. 18). This 
provides legislative support for the programme that the president is pursuing, 
increasing the chance that the proposed policies will be successful. The influence of 
the legislative branch is reduced in cases where the president possesses substantial 
constitutional powers, although a cohesive legislative opposition can act as a 
balancing force. The rigidity of the presidential system means that incentives for co-
operation between the president and the legislature are limited. These tensions are 
heightened in semi-presidential regimes where the powers of the two branches are 
more closely aligned and potentially less well defined (Elgie 2008). Strong presidents 
operate from a stable base as their position is less threatened by the actions of the 
legislature, providing the opportunity for greater progress if the president adopts a 
transformative style of leadership. In semi-presidential systems where the formal 
powers of the president are limited, the threat to his/her rule from the legislative 
branch is greater, potentially limiting opportunities for co-operation. Faced with 
competition in this manner, the president may choose to resort to a transactional 
leadership style, seeking short-term gains at the expense of longer-term stability and 
progress. The effect of the presidential system on the ability of the transitional 
leader to operate will now be examined through the case of Viktor Yushchenko as 
president of Ukraine. 
 
Transitional leadership in Ukraine 
The presidential-parliamentary system that operated in Ukraine before the Orange 
Revolution had a formal balance between the executive and legislative branches. 
This led to impasse preventing cohabitation, with neither branch willing to give 
ground. Tension within the regime also resulted from attempts by the president to 
consolidate and increase his position (Beichelt 2004, p. 124). President Leonid 
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Kuchma was able to make use of informal powers, weak civil society, national 
divisions, and presidential domination to exert his influence and dominate the 
political system by delegitimising parliament (Birch 2008, Kudelia 2007, p. 80). This 
position was buttressed by the election of supportive oligarchic and regional actors 
that had benefited from the privatisation process of the 1990s, providing a relatively 
stable support base in the Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) (Kuzio 2007, p. 31). 
Attempts to further strengthen the formal powers of the presidential office were 
undermined by the emergence of tapes in November 2000 that implicated the 
president in illegal activities, including weapons sales, electoral fraud, corruption, 
and intimidation against journalists and politicians (Kuzio 2007, p. 42). This event 
was significant in the democratisation of Ukraine, with Kuzio (2007, p. 44) arguing: 
 
if there had been no ‘Kuchmagate’ there would have been no Orange 
Revolution. The crisis did not lead to Kuchma’s downfall; nevertheless, it 
severely undermined the legitimacy of the ruling elites, discredited Kuchma, 
created a hard-core group of activists and awakened young people from 
their political apathy. 
 
Although these events ended Kuchma’s attempts to establish a formal basis for his 
increased powers, the opposition was unable to remove him from office due to the 
hurdle set by the impeachment process (Article 111, Constitution of Ukraine).  
 
During this time Viktor Yushchenko was playing an increasingly important role in the 
political system and building an independent support base. Yushchenko served as 
Prime Minister from 1999 to April 2001, when Kuchma orchestrated a no confidence 
vote in his government, as a result of his growing popularity (Kuzio 2007, pp. 41-42). 
In the subsequent 2002 elections Yushchenko’s party (Our Ukraine) emerged as the 
largest grouping in Parliament and moved to a position of strong opposition in the 
face of Kuchma’s continued presence (Birch 2003). Faced with a strong, popular 
challenger it appeared that Kuchma was unlikely to win the 2004 elections leading 
him to attempt to outflank the opposition by reducing the powers of the President 
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and increasing the corresponding power of Parliament (Kudelia 2007). Attempts to 
introduce amendments to the constitution along these lines were rejected by the 
Parliament in April 2004, as it failed to get the required two-thirds majority (Kuzio 
2007). In the lead up to the Orange Revolution there was a clear stalemate, with 
Kuchma and his supporters seeking means to retain power while opposition forces 
took to the streets to protest with increasing regularity. 
 
The presidential elections of 2004 provided an opportunity for opposition to the 
Kuchma regime to be expressed and for a democratic breakthrough to take place. 
Attempts by the incumbent regime to maintain power through manipulation of the 
elections resulted in widespread protests, a negotiated transfer of power and the 
election of Yushchenko (Hesli 2006). Although the protests that took place in Kyiv 
and across the country were important in expressing the frustration with regime, it 
was the negotiations that took place among the elites that were more significant in 
determining the way forward (Kubicek 2009). The second round of the presidential 
elections produced a result that went against the exit polls and expectations of 
observers, triggering the protests that sparked the revolution. Herron (2007, pp. 70-
71) argues that this was a key point in the democratisation process as:  
 
Yushchenko proved to be a formidable opponent. He succeeded in uniting 
an often fractious opposition, inspiring an indefatigable youth movement, 
and motivating a substantial proportion of the citizenry to commit active 
and passive acts of resistance after the fraudulent second round 
 
Faced with overwhelming pressure the regime and opposition held roundtable 
negotiations in which the Orange coalition accepted a constitutional amendment in 
exchange for a rerun of the second round, which Yushchenko was guaranteed to win 
(Kudelia 2007). Therefore, Kuchma was able to secure the transfer of important 
powers from the President to the Parliament in exchange for stepping aside and 
letting the vote take place without interference or manipulation.  
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It is important to consider the nature of the changes contained in the 2004 
constitutional amendment, as these did much to shape the relationships between 
the branches.1 Changes to Article 106(9) saw the President lose the power to 
appoint the Prime Minister, instead being required to put forward for confirmation a 
candidate determined by the Parliament. The President also lost the power to 
terminate the authority of the Prime Minister and decide on his/her resignation, this 
power passed to the Parliament, although the President can propose a vote of no 
confidence in the government (Article 87). Partially offsetting the increased powers 
of the Parliament, the President gained the power to terminate the Parliament 
where a coalition is not formed in one month or if a new Cabinet of Ministers is not 
appointed within 60 days following the resignation (Article 90). The powers of the 
Prime Minister remained relatively stable, as he/she retained the right to submit 
candidates for the Council of Ministers (although the authority to approve 
nominations shifted from the President to the Parliament) (Article 85(12)). However, 
in the event of pre-term termination of the powers of the President, the Chairperson 
of the Parliament and not the Prime Minister takes over (Article 112). Examining 
these key amendments it is clear that the underlying drive was to move power from 
the executive (President and Prime Minister) to the legislative branch (Parliament), 
leading to the formation of a much clearer semi-presidential system, with powers 
evenly balanced. It also meant that the government would be more closely linked to 
the Parliament.  
 
The victory of Yushchenko in the presidential elections opened the opportunity for 
substantive reform, moving the regime towards democracy. The first post-Orange 
government was formed in March 2005, after the confirmation of Yulia Tymoshenko 
as prime minister (Flikke 2008). Although the presidential elections had given victory 
to the Orange forces, this did not result in a substantive change in the operation of 
the political system. Tudoroiu (2007, pp. 329-330) argues that expectations the new 
regime would introduce deep political change were frustrated by the fact that the 
new leaders had been closely associated with the old regime. In addition, the 
agreement between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko to put aside their differences, 
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that allowed them to manipulate the opportunity presented by the Orange 
Revolution, fell apart during 2005 (Kuzio 2007). An important point is that the 
president had very little leverage within the system, even over his own party, leading 
him to rely on the presidential administration to balance the power of the 
government (Kubicek 2009). These tensions resulted in the removal of the 
Tymoshenko government in September 2005 and the introduction of a technocrat 
(Yurii Yekhanurov) as prime minister, to bridge gaps within the elite. In order to 
sustain the government Yushchenko was also required to compromise with Viktor 
Yanukovych, with the latter winning major concessions (Flikke 2008). Therefore, 
despite expectations of change, the Orange coalition was unable to introduce the 
hoped for decisive shift in the operation of the political system. 
 
The March 2006 elections were a further benchmark in the democratisation process 
and represented another missed opportunity. Although the Orange coalition won 
sufficient votes to form a coalition, it took three months to do so and it fell apart in 
two weeks, leading to the Socialists defecting to the opposing anti-crisis coalition 
(Flikke 2008). This failure saw the return of Yanukovych, who sought to capitalise on 
the increased strengths of the parliament by challenging the position of the 
president. Tensions between the branches were heightened as the new coalition 
sought revenge and introduced laws to give the prime minister complete control 
over cabinet, further weakening the influence of the president (Solonenko 2009). 
After continued struggles Yushchenko issued a decree in March 2007 dissolving 
parliament and calling for elections; following negotiations fresh parliamentary 
elections were held in September 2007 (Flikke 2008). 
 
Returning to the polls provided an opportunity for the Orange coalition to regain 
power and some of the momentum that had been lost. Tymoshenko was returned as 
prime minister in December following protracted coalition negotiations, but her 
position was undermined by criticism from the presidential secretariat (Pifer et al 
2009). This led once again to the collapse of the coalition ‘in 2008, indicating that the 
internal rivalry between President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko is 
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too deep to allow any chance of a sustainable alliance.’ (Solonenko 2009, p. 721). 
Conflict continued to plague the coalition, leading to the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc 
(BYuT) aligning with Yanukovych’s Party of the Regions in September 2008 to vote 
through laws further reducing the power of the president (Pifer et al 2009). The 
breakdown of the coalition followed the withdrawal of Our Ukraine and led 
Yushchenko to issue a decree in October for parliament to be dissolved. Although 
the decree was subsequently rescinded relations between the president and the 
government remained strained and prevented further progress (Pifer et al 2009). 
The final defeat of the Orange coalition came in January 2010 with the election of 
Yanukovych as president, defeating both Tymoshenko and Yushchenko who came a 
distant fifth with just five percent of the vote in the first round (Copsey and 
Shapovalova, 2010). 
 
Yushchenko as a failed transitional leader – actions and constraints 
The inability of Viktor Yushchenko to shift Ukraine in the direction of clear and 
unambiguous democratic practices was the result of a complex combination of 
factors. Hale (2010, p. 84) argues that ‘to consider Ukraine’s 2010 election a sign of 
democratic failure would be a mistake. In fact, it is partly the dirtiness of Ukraine’s 
democracy that sustains it and in fact augurs well for long-term success.’ Hence, the 
Yushchenko presidency needs to be seen in the broader context of what came 
before and the inherent tensions in the political system. While Yushchenko’s own 
actions were important in shaping the nature of relations within the system, the 
reformed institutional arrangements and environmental context did much to set the 
boundaries within which he was able to operate. This section examines his actions 
and explores the extent to which the presidential institutional structure undermined 
or limited opportunities for further change. 
 
Although Yushchenko emerged as a popular leader in the aftermath of the 
Kuchmagate scandal, as evidenced by the strong performance of Our Ukraine in the 
2002 Parliamentary elections, he was unable to turn this popularity into an effective 
move towards democracy. Kuzio (2007, p. 50) captures this difficulty when he argues 
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‘Yushchenko...was never a revolutionary.’ Yushchenko had served under the Kuchma 
regime in high-ranking positions before his electoral breakthrough and had not 
shown any indication that he was seeking to radically alter the system. Rather than a 
genuinely transformative leader winning the support of the people with a strong 
mandate for change, he emerged as a figure around which opposition to the Kuchma 
regime could rally, with the strong support of Tymoshenko (Kuzio 2007). Charisma 
can allow flaws to be overlooked (Kellerman 1984); in the case of Yushchenko the 
desire to remove the corrupt semi-authoritarian Kuchma regime had the same 
result, as his weaknesses were overlooked. Rather than being a transformative 
leader, able to rally support and bring together competing factions, Yushchenko 
operated much more as a transactional leader, competing for short-term political 
gains.  
 
The continued presence of many of the actors and structures from the previous 
regime also prevented a clean break with the past. Leonid Kuchma stepped down 
from the presidency in 2005, but the legacy of his regime continued to cast a shadow 
on the Yushchenko regime. As noted earlier, non-democratic legacies persist long 
after the change of a regime, continuing to influence values and behaviours (Hite 
and Morlino 2004). The complex system of corrupt patronage that had operated 
under Kuchma remained largely intact (Hale 2010). The constitutional amendment of 
2004 arguably undermined the ability of the incoming president to deal with these 
entrenched practices by shifting greater power to the parliament, which remained 
largely unchanged. Continuation in this manner had a detrimental effect on the 
regime as a lack of ‘fresh faces’ meant that political competition became a source of 
political rivalry and instability, leading to disillusionment within the society at large. 
(Solonenko 2009, p. 719). The most significant environmental constraint was the 
legacy of past practices; unable to overcome these legacies, Yushchenko was forced 
to work within them and accommodate them, undermining his position as a new 
leader intent on bringing change.  
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The failure of the Orange coalition to follow up the constitutional amendment that 
had been agreed with Kuchma had a detrimental effect on the ability of Yushchenko 
to operate and illustrated the challenges faced by the coalition. There was initially 
strong support from within the presidential administration and the government for 
reform of the amendment as it was seen as a return to the past, opening the way for 
instability as it muddled the separation of powers (Kubicek 2009). Solonenko (2009, 
p. 721) argues that: 
 
The transition from a presidential-parliamentary to a prime ministerial-
presidential system, as reflected in the revised version of the Constitution, 
was seen as a chance for the losers of the presidential elections to regain 
access to power through the 2006 parliamentary elections, whereby 
according to the new rules much of the president’s power would be 
transferred to the parliament. 
 
Change was possible, as the ‘amendment was a tabula rasa to be filled in by 
subsequent legal work’ (Flikke 2008, p. 379) providing an opportunity for the system 
to be restructured to meet the changed reality. Despite this opportunity, the 
coalition was unable to make substantial progress with ‘the number of draft laws 
initiated by the new president and the Prime Minister was the lowest ever submitted 
to parliament by the executive branch for any one legislative session since 
independence.’ (Tudoroiu 2007, p. 329) The tension within the executive prevented 
the presentation of a united front that would have allowed a strong move towards 
democratic stability. This lack of movement further restricted the ability of the 
president to direct the political system as power was shifted to the parliament in 
2006 with limited modifications. Although Yushchenko and his supporters were 
constrained by the legacy of the previous regime, the failure to introduce change 
under the constitutional amendment can be seen as a failure of leadership. 
 
While disagreements within the Orange coalition played an important role in limiting 
the opportunities to introduce change, other factors need to be acknowledged. It 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Contemporary 
Politics and Society on 8 November 2010, available online 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2010.523936 
 17 
was noted above that societies divided along ethno-cultural or geographic lines can 
increase the likelihood of conflict between branches, as there are competing 
demands to be satisfied. This is reflected in the regional support bases that 
presidential candidates were able to draw on in the elections, with Yushchenko 
drawing support from the western and central regions, while Yanukovych was 
stronger in the south and east (Copsey and Shapovalova, 2010). These divisions 
played an important role in shaping the relationship between the executive and 
legislative branches, as they relied on different support bases. As Sasse (2010, p. 
105) notes, regional divisions are not neatly and clearly defined, thereby helping to 
‘safeguard Ukraine against radicalism – whether nationalist, liberal, or authoritarian 
– though it also tends to produce delays and stalemates.’ The result being that while 
Yushchenko was constrained by these regional divisions, they acted as a ‘release 
valve’ permitting the expression of competing views and interests. 
 
The relationship between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko was a further complicating 
factor in the ability of Yushchenko to operate as a transformative leader. While there 
was a common cause between the two, in opposing the Kuchma regime, they were 
able to put aside their differences. However, when they gained power, the 
relationship broke down (Kuzio 2007). The character of the presidential system 
exacerbated the effects of this breakdown, with each actor having different 
interests. Division of responsibility allowed each to build a power base from which to 
operate and the incentives to collaborate were minimised, as each could blame the 
other for the failure to reform the system. Yushchenko’s weakness was exacerbated 
by the composition of the parliamentary coalition in which Tymoshenko’s party was 
the dominant partner (Flikke 2008). Unable to rely on partisan support the president 
was forced to rely on the constitutional powers that came with the office, leading to 
attempts to create parallel institutions to monitor the work of the government. The 
presence of two strong characters (Yushchenko and Tymoshenko) within the 
coalition undermined and weakened its ability to undertake the actions necessary to 
reform the system, as the competition between them became the focus.  
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Tensions within the regime continued to undermine the ability of the executive to 
operate. The lack of clarity between the respective roles of the president, prime 
minister, and the parliament saw attempts by each to gain power at the expense of 
the others. The significance of this is that institutions are more subject to revision 
than they appear, making it important to consider the role of actors in shaping 
events (Alexander 2001). The negotiated compromise that led to the appointment of 
Yanukovych as prime minister in 2006 presented a challenge to the power of the 
president, as it introduced an openly hostile government (Flikke 2008). BYuT, further 
illustrating the collapse of the Orange coalition, supported attempts by the 
government to claw back powers from the president through the introduction of the 
Coalition of Ministers law (Solonenko 2009). While the president’s powers were 
increasingly being undermined and co-opted by the oppositional parliament, his 
ability to react was restricted by the weakness of his partisan powers given the 
reduced influence of Our Ukraine.  
 
The challenges facing the transitional leader are considerable: governing and 
introducing change in a context of instability. At the same time, it is important to 
note that the transitional leader is an independent actor, whose decisions can foster 
stability or further destabilise the system. In this way, the capacity to govern and the 
capacity to introduce democratic reforms are connected. Where a leader is unable 
to govern effectively he/she is also less able to generate the support required to 
introduce necessary democratic reforms. The Yushchenko case illustrates the degree 
to which transitional leaders are able to shape the institutional structures within 
which they operate. Institutional constraints, particularly the strength of the 
parliament, did limit the extent to which Yushchenko was able to reform the political 
system. As a president in a system which had strengthened the role of the 
parliament, the lack of clear boundaries encouraged conflict rather than 
cooperation. However, this need not have so completely undermined the ability of 
the regime to function; this can be linked to Yushchenko’s inability to govern 
effectively in a transformational style, instead choosing short-term gains over longer-
term stability.  
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The aims of this paper were to examine the individual factors that shape the ability 
of a transitional leader to adapt to changed political contexts, and to assess the 
importance of presidential institutional arrangements in exacerbating leadership 
tensions. To this end, the paper has analysed the case of Viktor Yushchenko as a 
transitional leader, and the impact he had on democratisation in Ukraine. The 
Orange Revolution in Ukraine saw a strong challenge to the existing non-democratic 
regime of Leonid Kuchma and presented an opportunity to move towards a 
democratic political system. The associated shift to a prime ministerial-presidential 
system in Ukraine placed restrictions the ability of president Yushchenko to operate, 
but need not have weakened him so completely. On coming to power in 2005, 
Yushchenko had an opportunity to reform the political system as the transitional 
leader: an agent of change. Competing pressures and tensions that are faced by such 
leaders require a flexible approach, allowing responses proportionate to challenges. 
Rather than take the required action, Yuschenko chose instead to focus on securing 
his own position in ways similar to that of his predecessor, placing allies to counter 
potential challengers. The result was that when the constitutional reforms of 
December 2004 came into force they entrenched divisions and reduced his formal 
powers to address them. The inability of the Orange coalition to seize the 
opportunity presented by the regime change, due to infighting and conflict, 
ultimately undermined their support and resulted in the election of Viktor 
Yanukovych (Kuchma’s chosen successor in 2004) as president in 2010 (Copsey and 
Shapovalova 2010). 
 
In the case of Ukraine, the importance of institutions is clear: reforms to the relative 
strength of the legislative and executive branches introduced uncertainty and 
competition. The semi-presidential system saw divisions form between the executive 
and the legislative branches, as well as within the executive branch, as the actors 
competed to gain control. The inability of the regime to make a complete break with 
the previous regime also restricted the ability of the Orange coalition to overcome 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Contemporary 
Politics and Society on 8 November 2010, available online 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2010.523936 
 20 
opposition within the legislative branch and introduce change. In addition, the 
environment proved to be an important factor, as public disillusion with the actions 
of the elite limited the ability of the leader to draw on a broader societal support 
base. However, democratisation in Ukraine was an elite driven process, hence the 
lack of progress towards consolidation can be attributed to failure of the political 
leadership to effectively overcome their challenges and stabilise the way forward.  
 
The findings indicate that, while institutional factors can constrain the ability of a 
transitional leader to act, the leader’s chosen strategy is more important in 
determining the outcome. Yushchenko’s inability to move Ukraine more forcefully 
towards democratic consolidation was the result of his ineffective actions, rather 
than systemic weaknesses within the institutional configuration. In this case, the 
transitional leader’s inability to effectively address pre-existing tensions or adjust to 
the new reality resulted in a failed and shortened leadership lifespan.  
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